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INTRODUCTION

During 1998 the United Nations (U.N.) International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) made significant progress in the prosecution of persons
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responsible for the 1994 genocide of Tutsi and moderate Hutu in Rwanda.1
The ICTR's first two cases create an important historical record and a
jurisprudential road map to justice. The case against Rwandan ex-premier
Jean Kambanda established essential facts concerning what happened in
Rwanda during those fateful 100 days in 1994.2 Kambanda's extensive
admissions of guilt should dispel forever any doubts about the occurrence of
an intentionally orchestrated genocide in Rwanda. In the case against former
Taba bourgmestre (mayor) Jean-Paul Akayesu,3 the ICTR created a number
of important jurisprudential concepts and reasoning paths that it and other
tribunals will apply in future cases.
In addition, these two trials represent several milestones for international
humanitarian law. Jean Kambanda is the first person in history to accept
responsibility for genocide before an international court. He did so fifty
years after the U.N. adopted the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 4 Jean-Paul Akayesu is the first
person in history to have been found guilty of genocide after a trial by an
international tribunal. In addition, his trial represents the first time an international tribunal has conceptualized sexual violence, including rape, as an act
of genocide.
II. BACKGROUND TO THE RWANDAN CRISIS AND
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
Following the assassination of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana
when the plane carrying him was missiled out of the sky, probably by
5
hard-line Hutu, on April 6, 1994, Rwanda erupted into horrifying violence
resulting in the murder of approximately 800,000 people (mostly Tutsi), the
uprooting of about two million within Rwanda's borders, and the exodus of
over two million (mostly Hutu) to the neighboring countries of Zaire,
Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda.6 Immediately after Habyarimana's
death, the Presidential Guard, the Hutu-dominated national army, and the
1. See generally Payam Akhavan, The InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor Rwanda: The
Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 501 (1996) (describing the

background, organization, and law of the ICTR); Paul J. Magnarella, Expanding the Frontiers
of Humanitarian Law: The International Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda, 9 FLA. J. INT'L L.
421 (1994) (describing the background, organization, and law of the ICTR).
2. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S (Sept. 4, 1998) (visited Nov. 18,
1998) <http://www.ictr.org/english/judgements/kambanda.html>.
3. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998) (visited Nov. 18, 1998)
<http://www.ictr.org/english/judgements/akayesu.html>.
4. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]
5. GtRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 211-12 (1995).
6. Id. at 265, 312; see also COLETTE BRAECKMAN, RWANDA: HISTOIRE D'UN GENOCIDE

(1994) (describing the Rwandan events related in this article).
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Interahamwe (Hutu death squads) began a systematic campaign of murder
and genocide against hundreds of moderate and opposition Hutu and all
7
Tutsi.

Rwanda was Africa's most densely populated country, with rural peasants
constituting the bulk of its inhabitants. 8 It had a pre-genocide population of
approximately eight million,9 most of whom spoke Ikinyarwanda, a Bantu
language.10 About eighty-five percent of the people were classified as Hutu,
fourteen percent Tutsi, and one percent Twa or Pygmies. 1 Intermarriage
among these people, many of whom are Christian, was not uncommon. 2
Precolonial rule by the aristocratic Tutsi minority, as well as indirect rule
later by Belgian colonialists through Tutsi royalty, had created resentment
among the majority Hutu.13 Rwanda became independent of Belgium in
1962, and various Hutu factions controlled the government and military until
July of 1994.' 4 Periodically, throughout the period of independence there
were outbreaks of violence, resulting in the flight of Tutsi to surrounding
countries, especially to Uganda where they formed the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF) and Army. 5 In the 1960s, some exiled Tutsi invaded Rwanda
16
in unsuccessful attempts to regain power.
Major-General Juvrnal Habyarimana, a Hutu, came to power in 1973 as
the result of a military coup.1 7 During his twenty-one years of rule
(1973-1994), there were no Tutsi mayors or governors, only one Tutsi
military officer, just two Tutsi members of parliament, and only one Tutsi
cabinet minister.1 8 In addition, Hutu in the military were prohibited from
marrying Tutsi, 19 and all citizens were required to carry ethnic identity

7. PRUNIER, supra note 5, at 192-257.
8. Theodor Hanf, Rwanda, in 20 COLLIER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA 308 (Bernard Johnston ed.,

1993).
9. PRUNIER, supra note 5, at 4 (reporting the Rwanda population at 7,128,000 in 1989).
10. RICHARD F. NYROP, ET AL., AREA HANDBOOK FOR RWANDA 2 (1969).
11. Hanf, supra note 8, at 308; NYROP ET AL., supra note 10, at 6.
12. PRUNIER, supra note 5, at 5; see CATHERINE NEWBURY, THE COHESION OF
OPPRESSION: CLIENTSHIP AND ETHNICITY IN RWANDA: 1860-1960 (1988) (discussing
clientship and shifting ethnicity in Rwanda).
13. NYROP ET AL., supra note 10, at 44-47; PRUNIER, supra note 5, at 5; Catharine
Newbury, Background to Genocide in Rwanda, 23 ISSUE 12, 12 (1995).
14. PRUNIER, supra note 5, at 54, 299. The political history of Rwanda and its important
relations with surrounding countries, especially Burundi, are beyond the scope of this article.
For these important topics, see generally DIXON KAMUKAMA, RWANDA CONFLICT: ITS ROOTS
AND REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS (1993); RENt LEMARCHAND, RWANDA AND BURUNDI (1970).
15. PRUNIER, supra note 5, at 61-74. For a discussion of the RPF army and the civil war
up to 1994, see id. at 90-213.
16. Id. at 54.
17. Id. at 61.
18. Id. at 75.
19. Id.
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cards. 20 Habyarimana promoted a policy of internal repression against Tutsi,
particularly in the 1990s, when his government indiscriminately interred and
persecuted Tutsi, claiming they were actual or potential accomplices of the
RPF. 2' Hutu ultranationalists killed an estimated 2,000 Tutsi between 1990
and 1993 in addition to targeting human rights advocates, regardless of
22
ethnicity.
The campaign of genocide that followed Habyarimana's death ended in
July 1994 when the RPF Army routed the Hutu militias and army. The RPF
and moderate Hutu political parties formed a new government on July 18,
1994, but the country was in a state of chaos.23 The new government
pledged to implement the Arusha peace agreement on power sharing, which
previously had been reached between the Habyarimana regime and the RPF
on August 3, 1993.24 In a Presidential statement issued on August 10,
1995, the U.N. Security Council called upon the new Rwandan government
to ensure that there would be no reprisals against Hutu who wished to return
to their homes and resume their work, reminded the government of its
responsibility for a national reconciliation, and emphasized that the Arusha
peace agreement constituted an appropriate framework for reconciliation.2 5
The new Rwandan government was formed by a coalition of twenty
ministers drawn from the RPF (with nine ministers) and four other political
*26Wihbt
parties.
With both Tutsi and Hutu among its top officials, the government
committed itself to building a multiparty democracy and to discontinuing the
"ethnic" classification system utilized by the previous regime.27
On July 1, 1994, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 935,
which requested the U.N. Secretary General to form a commission of experts
to determine whether serious breaches of humanitarian law, including
genocide, had been committed in Rwanda. 28 In October 1994, the commission reported to the Security Council that genocide and systematic,

20. Id. at 76 n.62, 77. For purposes of these identity cards, ethnicity was determined by
patrilineal descent. U.S. Dep't of State, Rwanda Human Rights Practices (1994), available

in LEXIS, INTLAW Library, DSTATE File. Consequently, even the children of mixed
marriages were classified either as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa, depending on the identity cards of
their fathers. Id.
21.

Villia Jefremovas, Acts of Human Kindness: Tutsi, Hutu and the Genocide, 23 ISSUE

28, 29 (1995); Newbury, supra note 13, at 14.
22. Newbury, supra note 13, at 14.
23.

PRUNIER, supra note 5, at 299.

24. Id. at 329.
25.

U.N. SCOR, Statement by the Presidentof the Security Council, 3414th mtg. at 1-2,

U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1994/42 (1994).
26. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 20.
27. Raymond Bonner, Rwanda's Leaders Vow to Build a Multiparty State for Both Hutu

and Tutsi, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1994, at A10.
28. S.C. Res. 935, U.N. SCOR, 3400th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 (1994).
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widespread, and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law,
resulting in massive loss of life, had been committed in Rwanda. 29 On
November 8, 1994, the U.N. Secretary-General submitted to the Security
Council a statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, stating
that he was "[c]onvinced that ...

the prosecution of persons responsible for

serious violations of international humanitarian law [in Rwanda] ... would
contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and
maintenance of peace. 3 ° He recommended that this Tribunal, like the one
created by the Security Council in 1993 for the former Yugoslavia, be
established under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. 3' The Security Council
adopted the Secretary-General's report and the ICTR Statute without
change.32
Article I of the Statute limits the ICTR's temporal jurisdiction to the year
1994 only.33 Article 1 also states that the ICTR "shall have the power to
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens
responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighboring
states. 34 Consequently, the Statute gives the Tribunal both personal and
territorial jurisdiction in Rwanda, as well as limited personal and territorial
jurisdiction in surrounding states.
Because the Security Council is not a legislative body, it had no
competency to enact substantive law for the Tribunal. Instead, it authorized
the Tribunal to apply existing international humanitarian law that is
applicable to noninternational armed conflict.35 The humanitarian law
included in the ICTR Statute consists of the Genocide Convention,36 ratified

29. Letter Dated 1 October 1994 from the Secretary-GeneralAddressed to the President
of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125 (1994).

30. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453rd mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994)
[hereinafter ICTR Statute].
31. Id. Annex, at 3; see M. Cherif Bassiouni, Former Yugoslavia: Investigating Violations
of InternationalHumanitarianLaw and Establishingan InternationalCriminal Tribunal, 18

FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1191, 1192 (1995) (discussing the establishment of the International
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia); see also Paul J. Magnarella, Trying for Peace Through
Law: The U.N. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 10(3) HUMAN PEACE 3-8 (1995)
(describing and analyzing that Tribunal's legal structure); Theodor Meron, War Crimes in
Yugoslavia and Development of International Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 76, 78 (1994); Ruth
Wedgwood, War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: Comments on the International War

Crimes Tribunal, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 266-75 (1994) (stating that the tribunal for Yugoslavia
was the first significant international criminal tribunal).
32. See ICTR Statute, supra note 30.
33. Id. art. 1.
34. Id.

35. Id.
36. Genocide Convention, supra note 4, 78 U.N.T.S. at 277.
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by Rwanda, crimes against humanity as defined by the Nuremberg Charter,37 Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions,38 and Additional
Protocol I139 also ratified by Rwanda. Both the prohibition and punishment
of acts of genocide and crimes against humanity are part of customary
international law imposing legal obligations on all states.4 °
III.

THE CASE AGAINST JEAN KAMBANDA

A.

Introduction

The case against former Rwandan Premier Jean Kambanda,4' the first
person in history to accept responsibility for genocide, is of monumental
significance to Rwandans, Africans, and all people concerned with this
dreadful crime. This, the first case to be concluded at the ICTR, is extremely
important for learning the truth about what happened in Rwanda during those
fateful 100 days in 1994. Kambanda's extensive admissions of guilt should
dispel forever any doubts about the occurrence of intentionally orchestrated
mass murder in Rwanda. Kambanda's confession and willingness to offer
testimony in other cases are significant because they will probably influence
the pleas of other Rwandan defendants in ICTR custody.
B.

Kambanda's Background and Arrest

Jean Kambanda, the highest-ranking former political leader in ICTR
custody, was born on October 10, 1955 at Mubumbano in the Prefecture of
Butare.4 2 He has a wife and two children, and holds the Diploma
d'Ingenieur Commercial.43

From May 1989 to April 1994, he was

employed by the Union des Banques Populaires du Rwanda, where he
became the Director." He was Vice President of the Butare Section of the
MDR (Mouvement Democratique Republicain) and a member of its political

37. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, Charter of the International Military Tribunal. Done at London,
Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 284.
38. Geneva Conventions Nos. 970-973, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 85, 135, 287,
respectively.
39. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter Protocol II].
40. HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 140 (1990).
41. Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S (visited Nov. 18, 1998)
<http://www.ictr.org/english/judgements/kambanda.html>.
42. Id. at § III.B., 45.
43. Id.

44. Id.
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bureau.45 He became Prime Minister of Rwanda's interim government on
April 9, 1994, three days after the mysterious downing of the plane carrying
then-President Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprian
Ntayamira.4 6 Habyarimana's death signaled the beginning of three months
of carnage. Kambanda's predecessor, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, and ten of the
Belgian U.N. soldiers protecting her were slaughtered by extremist Hutu soon
after Habyarimana's plane crash.47
Shortly before the RFP Army took
control of Rwanda in July 1994, Kambanda fled with his family to Kenya.48
At the request of the ICTR, Kenyan authorities arrested Kambanda along
with six other Rwandan genocide suspects on July 18, 1997. 49 Former
Cabinet minister, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, the interim family welfare
minister, was arrested with Kambanda, along with her son, Arsene Shalom
Ntahobali.5 ° Colonel Gratien Kabiligi and Commander Aloys Ntabakuze,
two senior military officials, Sylvain Nsabimana, prefect of Butare, where
many anti-Tutsi massacres occurred, and Hassan Ngeze, a prominent media
figure accused of distributing materials inciting violence against the Tutsi
were also arrested. 51 The suspects were transferred to the ICTR's detention
center in Arusha, Tanzania, where they were held.52 The arrests meant that
the ICTR, after a slow start, had more high ranking suspects in custody than
its sister institution - The U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) - at the Hague.
C. Indictment
The Prosecutor's Office submitted its indictment against Kambanda on
October 16, 1997 to Judge Yakov Ostrovsky (Russia), who confirmed it,
issued a warrant of arrest against the accused and ordered his continued
detention.5 3 The indictment contained six counts: genocide, conspiracy to
commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide,
complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity (murder), and crimes against
humanity (extermination). 4 On May 1, 1998, during his initial appearance
before Trial Chamber 1, consisting of Judges Laity Kama (Senegal), Lennart

45. Id.
46. Id.

47.

PRUNIER,

supra note 5, at 229-30.

48. Rwanda: Top Figures of Former Regime Arrested, ICTR/INFO-9-2 (18 July 1997)

Arusha, TZ.
49. Rwanda-U.N.: Tribunal Nabs Former Prime Minister,Six Others, Inter Press Service,

July 18, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library.
50. Id.
51. Id.

52. Id.
53. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, § I.A.,
54. Id. 3.
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Aspegren (Sweden), and Navanethem Pillay (South Africa), Kambanda
pleaded guilty to all six counts."
Genocide, as defined in the 1948 Convention for the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and in the Statute of the ICTR (Art.
2), is a specific intent crime.56 Thus, for a crime of genocide to have been
committed, it is necessary that one of the acts listed under Article 2(2) of the
ICTR Statute, for example, killing, or causing serious bodily or mental harm,
be committed against a specifically targeted "national, ethnical, racial or
religious group" with the intent to destroy it, "in whole or in part., 57 A
potential defense for many Rwandan genocide suspects is that the 1994
killings were part of an ordinary war or civil upheaval, without any intent to
destroy a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious group, in whole or
in part. Significantly, however, Kambanda admitted that the extermination
of Tutsi was a policy of his government.58
D.

Kambanda'sAdmissions and Sentence

On May 1, 1998, during his initial appearance before an ICTR Trial
Chamber in Arusha, Tanzania, Jean Kambanda pleaded guilty to the six
counts contained in his indictment, "namely genocide, conspiracy to commit
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, complicity in
genocide, crimes against humanity (murder), punishable under Article 3(a)
of the [ICTR] Statute and crimes against humanity
(extermination),
59
punishable under Article 3 (b) of the [ICTR] Statute.
Together with his guilty plea, on April 28, 1998 Jean Kambanda
submitted to the Chamber a document entitled "Plea Agreement between Jean
Kambanda and the Office of the Prosecutor," which was signed by himself
and Oliver Michael Inglis his defense counsel from Cameroon. 60 The Plea
Agreement states that "no agreements, understandings or promises ha[d] been
made between the parties with respect to sentence, which ... is at the

discretion of the Trial Chamber., 61 In the Plea Agreement, however,
Prosecutor disclosed that it had recognized Kambanda's cooperation
promising protection measures for his family to alleviate concerns he had
62
their safety.
In his plea Jean Kambanda admitted all the relevant facts alleged in

the
by
for
the

55. Id.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Genocide Convention, supra note 4, art. II; ICTR Statute, supra note 30, art. 2.
ICTR Statute, supra note 30, art. 2(2).
Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, § HILA, T 39(i)-(xi).
Id. § I.A., 3.
Id. § III.A., 39.

61. Id. § III.B.,
62. Id. T 49.

48.
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indictment.63 In particular,
(i) [h]e admitted that there was in Rwanda in 1994 a widespread and
systematic attack against the civilian population of Tutsi, with the
intent to exterminate them. Mass killings of hundreds of thousands
of Tutsi occurred in Rwanda, including women and children, old and
young who were pursued and killed at places where they had sought
refuge, [that is,] prefectures, commune offices, schools, churches and
stadiums.
(ii) [He] acknowledge[d] that as Prime Minister of the Interim
Government of Rwanda from April 8, 1994 to July 17, 1994, he was
head of the 20 member Council of Ministers and exercised de jure
authority and control over the members of his government. The
government determined and controlled national policy and had the
administration and armed forces at its disposal. As Prime Minister,
he also exercised de jure and de facto authority over senior civil
servants and senior officers in the military.
(iii) [He] acknowledge[d] that he participated in meetings of the
Council of Ministers, cabinet meetings and meetings of prefets where
the course of massacres were actively followed, but [took] no action
S. . to stop them ....

[He] also acknowledge[d] participation in the

dismissal of the prefet of Butare because the latter had opposed the
massacres and the appointment of a new prefet to ensure the spread
of massacre of Tutsi in Butare.
(iv) [He] acknowledge[d] his participation in a high level security
meeting at Gitarama in April 1994 between the President, T.
Sindikubwabo, himself and the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Armed
Forces (FAR) and others, which discussed FAR's support in the fight
against the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and its "Accomplices,"
understood to be the Tutsi and moderate Hutu.
(v) [He] acknowledge[d] that he issued the Directive on Civil
Defence addressed to the prefets on May 25, 1994 (Directive No.
024-0273, disseminated on June 8, 1994). [He] further admitted that
this directive encouraged and reinforced the Interahamwe who were
committing mass killings of the Tutsi civilian population in the
prefectures [and] ...

acknowledge[d] that by this directive the

Government assumed the responsibility for the actions of the
Interahamwe.
(vi) [He] acknowledge[d] that before April 6, 1994, political parties
in concert with the Rwandan Armed Forces organized and began the
military training of the youth wings of the MRND and CDR political

63. Id. § III.A.,

39.
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parties (Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi respectively) with the
intent to use them in the massacres that ensued. Furthermore, [he]
acknowledge[d] that the Government headed by him distributed arms
and ammunition to these groups. Additionally, [he] confirmed that
roadblocks manned by mixed patrols of the Rwandan Armed Forces
and the Interahamwe were set up in Kigali and elsewhere as soon as
the death of President J.B. Habyarimana was announced on the
Radio. [He also] acknowledge[d] the use of the media as part of the
plan to mobilize and incite the population to commit massacres of
the civilian Tutsi population. [He] acknowledge[d] the existence of
groups within military, militia, and political structures which had
planned the elimination of the Tutsi and Hutu political opponents.
(vii) [He] acknowledge[d] that, on or about June 21, 1994, in his
capacity as Prime Minister, he gave clear support to Radio Television
Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), with the knowledge that it was a
radio station whose broadcasts incited killing, the commission of
serious bodily or mental harm to, and persecution of Tutsi and
moderate Hutu. On this occasion, speaking on this radio station,
[he], as prime minister, encouraged the RTLM to continue to incite
the massacres of the Tutsi civilian population, specifically stating that
this radio station was "an indispensable weapon in the fight against
the enemy."
(viii) [He] acknowledge[d] that following numerous meetings of the
Council of Ministers between April 8, 1994 and July 17, 1994, he as
Prime Minister, instigated, aided and abetted the Prefets,
Bourgmestres, and members of the population to commit massacres
and killings of civilians, in particular Tutsi and moderate Hutu.
Furthermore, between April 24, 1994 and July 17, 1994, [he] and
[the] ministers of his Government visited several prefectures, such as
Butare, Gitarama (Nyabikenke), Gikongoro, Gisenyi and Kibuye to
incite and encourage the population to commit these massacres,
including by congratulating the people who had committed these
killings.
(ix) [He] acknowledged that on May 3, 1994, he was personally
asked to take steps to protect children who had survived the massacre
at a hospital[, but] he did not respond. On the same day, after the
meeting, the children were killed. He acknowledge[d] that he failed
in his duty to ensure the safety of the children and the population of
Rwanda.
(x) [He] admitt[ed] that in ...

the name of the government, he

addressed public meetings, and the media, at various places in
Rwanda directly and publicly inciting the population to commit acts
of violence against Tutsi and moderate Hutu.
(xi) [He] acknowledge[d] that he ordered the setting up of roadblocks
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol11/iss3/2
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with the knowledge that these roadblocks were used to identify Tutsi
for elimination, and that as Prime Minister he participated in the
distribution of arms and ammunition to members of political parties,
militias and the population knowing that these weapons would be
used in the perpetration of massacres of civilian Tutsi.
(xii) [He] acknowledge[d] that he knew or should have known that
persons for whom he was responsible were committing crimes of
massacre upon Tutsi and that he failed to prevent them or punish the
perpetrators. [He] admitte[d] that he was an eye witness to the
massacres of Tutsi and also had knowledge of them from cabinet
discussions and regular reports of prefets, and cabinet discussions.64
After determining that Kambanda's guilty plea was entered voluntarily
and knowingly, without threats or promises, the Trial Chamber found him
guilty on all six counts and, on September 4, 1998, sentenced him to a single
term of life in prison.65
E.

Conclusion

Kambanda's extensive confession concerning his government's
intentional and well-advertised policy of genocide constitutes the fundamental
fact upon which future ICTR prosecutions will rest. His confession also
destroys the credibility, if it existed, of revisionist historians, who claim a
genocide never took place. Kambanda's confession will affect all ICTR
suspects as well as the over 100,000 suspects imprisoned in Rwanda. Those
who are guilty of participating in the genocide will have little choice but to
admit their crimes or modify their defenses in hopes of getting more lenient
sentences.
According to ICTR prosecutor Mohammad C. Othman, Kambanda is
expected serve as a prosecution witness in several upcoming trials.66
Kambanda may also supply additional pages to Rwanda's recent history by
answering questions surrounding the April 6, 1994 mysterious downing of the
plane carrying Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana.

64. Id. § III.A.(i)-(xii).
65. Id. 61.
66. James C. McKinley, Ex-Rwandan Premier Gets in Prison on Charges of Genocide in
'94 Massacres, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1998, at 4A.
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THE CASE AGAINST JEAN-PAUL AKAYESU

A.

Introduction

The case against Jean-Paul Akayesu 67 is significant for a series of
reasons: it was the first trial before an international tribunal of someone
charged with genocide, and it was the first trial in which an international
tribunal conceptualized sexual violence, including rape, as an act of genocide.
Also, because this was the ICTR's first judgment based on a contested trial,
the justices had to face many jurisprudential issues for the first time. Trial
Chamber I's lengthy Judgment of September 2, 1998 carefully explicates the
facts, reasoning, and rules it relied upon to reach its conclusions. By so
doing, this Judgment will stand as an historic precedent for future tribunals
dealing with similar issues.
B.

Akayesu's Background

Jean-Paul Akayesu, a Rwandan national, was born in 1953.6 8 He is
married, with five children. Prior to becoming bourgmestre (mayor) of Taba
commune, in the Gitarama prefecture of Rwanda, he was a teacher, then an
inspector of schools. Akayesu entered politics in 1991, becoming a founding
member of the Mouvement DimocratiqueRipublicain (MDR). He served as
chairman of the local wing of the MDR in Taba commune. In April 1993,
Akayesu, with the support of several key figures and influential groups in the
commune, was elected bourgmestre of Taba. He held that position until June
1994, when he fled to Zambia.69
C. Arrest and Indictment
Jean-Paul Akayesu was arrested in Zambia on October 10, 1995.70 On
November 22, 1995, the Prosecutor of the Tribunal, pursuant to Rule 40 of
the Rules, requested the Zambian authorities to keep Akayesu in detention for
a period of 90 days, while awaiting the completion of the investigation into
potential charges against him. On February 13, 1996, the then Prosecutor,
Richard Goldstone, submitted an indictment against Akayesu. This was
subsequently amended on June 17, 1997 to add rape to the charges. The
final indictment contained a total of fifteen counts individually charging
Akayesu with genocide, complicity in genocide, direct and public incitement
67. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998) (visited Nov.
18, 1998) <http://www.ictr.org/english/judgements/akayesu.html>.
68. Id.§ 1.1, 3.
69. Id.

70. Id. § 1.4.1,

7.
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to commit genocide, extermination, murder, torture, cruel treatment, rape,
other inhumane acts and outrages upon personal dignity, crimes against
humanity and violations of Article 3 Common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol 11. 7 1 Judge William H. Sekule confirmed the
indictment and issued an arrest warrant, accompanied by an order for
continued detention, on February 16, 1996. Akayesu was transferred to the
ICTR detention facilities in Arusha, Tanzania on May 26, 1996.72
D. Are the Tutsi a Protected Group?
Before deciding whether Akayesu was guilty of acts of genocide, the
Chamber had to determine whether genocide as defined in Article 2 of the
ICTR Statute, which replicates the Genocide Convention, had occurred in
Rwanda. According to ICTR Statute Article 2(2):
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent
destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
to
group as such:
a) Killing members of the group;
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part;
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
transferring children of the group to another
e) Forcibly
73
group.

The Chamber reasoned that since the special intent to commit genocide
lies in the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
social group, it was necessary to determine the meaning of these social
categories. Because neither the Genocide Convention nor the ICTR Statute
had defined them, the task fell upon the Chamber itself. Based on its reading
of the travaux priparatoiresof the Genocide Convention, the Chamber
concluded that the drafters perceived the crime of genocide as targeting only
stable, permanent groups, whose membership is determined by birth.7 4 The
drafters excluded more mobile groups, such as political and economic groups,
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. § 1.4.1 9.
Id. I 11.
ICTR Statute, supra note 30, art. 2(2).
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, § 6.3.1.
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that one joins voluntarily. 7- The Chamber then proceeded to define each of
the social categories listed in the ICTR Statute:
Based on the Nottebohm decision rendered by the International
Court of Justice, the Chamber holds that a national group is defined
as a collection of people who are perceived to share a legal bond
based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and
duties.
An ethnic group is generally defined as a group whose members
share a common language or culture.
The conventional definition of racial group is based on the
hereditary physical traits often identified with a geographical region,
irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious factors.
The religious .group is one whose members share the same
religion, denomination or mode of worship.7 6
Significantly, the Tutsi-Hutu distinction in Rwanda does not fit into any
of the above categories. The Tutsi belong to the same religious groups and
national group as do the Hutu. The Tutsi and Hutu share a common
language and culture. And, if there had been any hereditary physical traits
distinguishing Hutu from Tutsi, they have become largely obliterated through
generations of intermarriage. Consequently, had the ICTR justices stopped
here, they would have been forced to conclude that genocide, as legally
defined in the Convention and Statute, had not occurred in Rwanda.
Fortunately, the justices did not stop here. They next asked "whether it
would be impossible to punish the physical destruction of a group as such
under the Genocide Convention, if the said group, although stable and
membership is by birth, does not meet the definition of any one of the four
groups expressly protected by the Genocide Convention [and Article 2 of the
ICTR Statute]. 77 They concluded that the answer is "no," because it is
"important to respect the intention of the drafters of the Genocide Convention, which according to the travaux prdparatoires,was patently to ensure the
protection of any stable and permanent group. 78
Next, the Chamber asked whether the Tutsi constituted a stable and
permanent group for purposes of the Genocide Convention. To answer this

75. Id.

76. Id. § 6.3.1,
77. Id. 307.

299-305.

78. Id.
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question, the Chamber considered evidence provided by eye-witness and
expert testimony during the trial. The Chamber noted that the Tutsi
constituted a group referred to as "ethnic" in official Rwandan classifications.7 9 Identity cards prior to 1994 contained a reference to "ubwoko"
in Kinyarwanda or "ethnie" (ethnic group) in French which referred to the
designations Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. 80 The Chamber noted that all the
Rwandan witnesses who appeared before it invariably answered without
hesitation the prosecutor's questions regarding their ethnic identity.8'
Earlier in its Judgement, the Chamber noted that witnesses testified that
"[e]ven pregnant women, including those of Hutu origin, were killed on the
grounds that the foetuses in their wombs were fathered by Tutsi men, for in
a patrilineal society like Rwanda, the child belongs to the father's group of
origin. 82 Witness PP testified that Akayesu had made a public statement
to the effect that "if a Hutu woman were impregnated by a Tutsi man, the
Hutu woman had to be found in order 'for the pregnancy to be aborted.'"83
Given these and related facts, the Chamber found that at the time of the
alleged events, "the Tutsi did indeed constitute a stable and permanent group
and were identified as such by all." 84 Consequently, they were protected by
the Genocide Convention and Article 2 of the ICTR Statute.
Here, the Chamber made two critical determinations that will greatly
influence future cases involving the crime of genocide. By adding "stable
and permanent group, whose membership is largely determined by birth," to
the four existing categories, that is, national, ethnical, racial, and religious
group, of the Genocide Convention, the Chamber has significantly expanded
the kinds of populations that will be protected by that Convention. The
Chamber also expanded upon the categories of protected peoples by refusing
to confine itself to an objective, universalistic definition of ethnic group.
Instead, it relied on the subjective perceptions of the Rwandan people.
Consequently, it established as a precedent the idea that a court may regard
any stable and permanent group, whose membership is largely determined by
birth, as an ethnic group for purposes of the Genocide Convention as long
as the people of the society in question perceive that group to be different
from others according to local, subjective criteria.
E. Determining Intent
As explained above, specific intent is a constitutive element of the crime

79. Id. § 7.8, T 157.
80. Id.

81. Id.

82. Id. § 3, 1 225.
83. Id.
84. Id. § 7.8, T 157.
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of genocide. Intent is a mental factor that is difficult to determine with
precision in the absence of a sincere confession or public admission by the
accused. The Chamber provided another jurisprudential roadway by
maintaining that in the absence of a confession, the accused's intent can be
inferred from a number of presumptions of fact. The Chamber reasoned that
"it is possible to deduce the genocidal intent inherent in a particular act
charged from the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts
systematically directed against that same group, whether these acts were
committed by the same offender or by others. 85 Specific factors that the
Chamber believed could enable it to infer the genocidal intent of a particular
act included the scale of atrocities committed, their general nature, and the
deliberate and systematic targeting of people because of their membership in
a particular group, while excluding members of other groups.86
Here, the Chamber offers a method for determining an individual's
constructive genocidal intent. This method involves placing an accused's
particular act(s) against a victim within the broad context of prevalent and
culpable acts directed at other persons because they are members of the
victim's group, even if these acts were perpetrated by persons other than the
accused.
F. Sexual Violence and Rape as Crimes Against
Humanity and Genocide
The Indictment against Jean-Paul Akayesu was submitted on February 13,
1996 by then Prosecutor Richard Goldstone and was confirmed on February
16, 1996.87 Originally, it did not contain specific charges of sexual crimes.
However, prosecutors amended the Indictment during the trial, in June 1997,
and resubmitted it, under the signature of Prosecutor Louise Arbour, with the
addition of three counts (13 to 15) and three paragraphs (10A, 12A, and
12B). 88
In paragraph 10A the Prosecutor proposes a definition of sexual violence
to clarify the allegations set forth in paragraphs 12A and 12B. 89 These
three paragraphs are reproduced below:
10A. In this indictment, acts of sexual violence include forcible
sexual penetration of the vagina, anus or oral cavity by a penis
and/or of the vagina or anus by some other object, and sexual abuse,

85. Id. § 6.3.1,
86. Id.

321.

87. Id. § 1.2.
88. Id.

89. Id.

10A.
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such as forced nudity.

12A. Between April 7 and the end of June, 1994, hundreds of
civilians (hereinafter "displaced civilians") sought refuge at the
bureau communal. The majority of these displaced civilians were
Tutsi. While seeking refuge at the bureau communal, female
displaced civilians were regularly taken by armed local militia and/or
communal police and subjected to sexual violence, and/or beaten on
or near the bureau communal premises. Displaced civilians were also
murdered frequently on or near the bureau communal premises.
Many women were forced to endure multiple acts of sexual violence
which were at times committed by more than one assailant. These
acts of sexual violence were generally accompanied by explicit
threats of death or bodily harm. The female displaced civilians lived
in constant fear and their physical and psychological health
deteriorated as a result of the sexual violence and beatings and
killings.
12B. Jean Paul AKAYESU knew that the acts of sexual violence,
beatings and murders were being committed and was at times present
during their commission. Jean Paul AKAYESU facilitated the
commission of the sexual violence, beatings and murders by allowing
the sexual violence and beatings and murders to occur on or near the
bureau communal premises. By virtue of his presence during the
commission of the sexual violence, beatings and murders and by
failing to prevent the sexual violence, beatings and murders, Jean
Paul AKAYESU encouraged these activities. 90
Count 13 of the Indictment charged Akayesu with rape as a crime against
humanity, punishable under ICTR Statute Article 3(g) (which specifically
names rape as a crime against humanity). 9' In addressing this charge, the
Chamber noted that "there is no commonly accepted definition of the term
90. Id. 10A, 12A, 12B. In introducing the amended Indictment, prosecutors stated that
"the testimony of Witness H motivated them to renew their investigation of sexual violence
in connection with events which took place in Taba at the bureau communal." Id. § 5.5,
107. Prosecutors noted that evidence previously available was insufficient to connect Akayesu
to acts of sexual violence. Id. They explained that the lack of evidence might be attributed
to the shame that victims of sexual violence feel and the insensitivity shown in investigations
of sexual violence. Id. The defense in its closing statement complained that "the Indictment
[had been] amended in response to public pressure concerning the prosecution of sexual
violence." Id. The Chamber noted that nongovernmental organizations had expressed interest
in this issue. Id.
91. Id.; ICTR Statute, supra note 30, art. 3(g).
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['rape'] in international law.",9 2 It chose to regard rape as a form of
aggression and looked to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment for guidance in its
formulation of a definition. The Chamber observed that that Convention
"does not catalogue specific acts in its definition of torture, [but rather
focuses] on the conceptual framework of state sanctioned violence." 93 The
Chamber reasoned that rape, like torture, is used for such purposes as
"intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control
or destruction of a person." 94 It further stated that "[like torture, rape is a
violation of personal dignity, and rape ... constitutes torture when ...
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence
of a
' 95
public official or other person acting in an official capacity."
The Chamber also reasoned that acts constituting crimes against humanity
have "four essential elements:" 96

(i) the act must be inhumane in nature and character, causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health;
(ii) the act must be committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack;
(iii) the act must be committed against members of the civilian
population;
(iv) the act must be committed on one or more discriminatory
grounds, namely, national, political, ethnic, racial or religious
grounds.97
With these elements in mind, the Chamber defined rape and sexual
violence for purposes of Crimes against Humanity as
a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under
circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence which includes
rape, is considered to be any act of a sexual nature which is
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. This
act must be committed:
(a) as part of a wide spread or systematic attack;

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, § 7.7,
Id. 129.
Id.

127.

Id.
Id. § 6.4,
Id. 82.

81.
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(b) on a civilian population;
(c) on certained catalogued discriminatory grounds, namely:
national, ethnic, political, racial, or religious grounds.98
Further on in the Judgment, the Chamber stated that "[s]exual violence
is not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may include acts
which do not involve penetration or even physical contact."9 9 The Chamber
noted as an example of sexual violence the incident described by Witness KK
in which Akayesu ordered the Interahamwe to undress a student and force
her to do gymnastics naked before a crowd in the public courtyard of the
bureau communal." ° Hence, by not confining sexual violence to cases of
bodily penetration, the Chamber went beyond the definition of sexual
violence offered by the Prosecutor in paragraph 10A of the Indictment.1"'
The Chamber found that there was sufficient credible evidence to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Tutsi girls and women were
subjected to sexual violence, beaten, and killed on or near the bureau
communal premises, as well as elsewhere in the commune of Taba in
1994. 02 The Chamber also found beyond a reasonable doubt that Akayesu
knew, or had reason to know, that sexual violence was being inflicted on
those women who were kept at the bureau communal and on those who were
taken from there. The Chamber found no evidence that the accused took any
measures to prevent acts of sexual violence or to punish the perpetrators. °3
To the contrary, there was evidence that Akayesu ordered, instigated, aided,
and abetted sexual violence.' °4 Consequently, the Chamber found Akayesu
guilty of rape as a crime against humanity. 5
Count 1 of the Indictment charged Akayesu with the crime of genocide,
punishable under Article 2(3)(a) of the Statute, which simply lists "genocide"
as one of the acts of genocide. 1' Count 1 made no specific reference to
sexual violence or rape. However, among the definitions of genocide offered
by Article 2(2) is "[c]ausing serious bodily or mental harm to members of [a]
group." 107
The Tribunal sua sponte chose to consider sexual violence in connection
to Count 1 and the allegations made in paragraphs 12(A) and 12(B) of the

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. W 121-22.
Id. § 7.7, 1 131.
Id
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, § 5.5, 171.
Id. § 7.7, 137.
Id. T 139.
Id. at § 8.
Id. § 1.2.
ICTR Statute, supra note 30, art. 2(2)(b).
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Indictment. 10 8 The three justices reasoned that the acts of rape and sexual
violence contained in the Indictment constituted genocide in the same way
as any other act listed under "Genocide" Article 2(2) of the ICTR Statute, as
long as they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a particular group, in this case the Tutsi.' 9 Rape and sexual
violence certainly constitute inflictions of "serious bodily and mental
harm"' 0 on victims. In light of all the evidence before it, the Chamber
was satisfied that the acts of rape and sexual violence described by witnesses
were perpetrated solely against Tutsi women, many of whom were subjected
to the worst public humiliation, being mutilated and raped several times,
often in public, in the Bureau Communal premises or in other public places,
and frequently by more than one assailant. 1 The Chamber concluded that
these rapes "resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi
women, their families and their communities. Sexual violence was an
integral part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women
and specifically contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the
' 12
Tutsi group as a whole."
The Tribunal found that Akayesu had "aided and abetted" the acts of
sexual violence by allowing them to take place in his presence on, or near,
the premises of the bureau communal and by "verbally encouraging" the
commission of these acts. 1 3 The Chamber stated that because of his
position of authority, his open encouragement was a clear signal of official
tolerance for sexual violence, which would not have happened if he had not
done SO. 1 14 Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the acts alleged in
paragraphs 12A and 12B of the Indictment and subsequently proven at trial
constitute the crime of genocide for which it found Akayesu individually
criminally responsible."'
V.

SOME FINAL OBSERVATONS

The Kambanda case constitutes a fundamental, factual building block

108. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
109. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, § 7.8, M 219-21.
110. ICTR Statute, supra note 30, art. 2(2)(b).
111. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, § 7.8, 1215.
112. Id.
113. Id. at § 7.7, 141.
114. Id.
115. Id. § 7.9, 1 237. Judge Navanethem Pillay of South Africa, the Tribunal's only
female judge, served on Trial Chamber I and participated in the Akayesu judgment. She
reportedly told a reporter: " 'From time immemorial, rape has been regarded as spoils of war.
•.. Now it will be considered a war crime. We want to send out a strong signal that rape
is no longer a trophy of war.'" Bill Berkeley, Judgement Day, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1998,
at W1O (quoting Judge Pilley).
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upon which an understanding of the decisions and policies of the immediate
Kambanda's
post-Habyarimana Rwandan government will be built.
comprehensive admissions expell any doubts about the existence of an
official policy of genocide against Tutsi. His future cooperation with the
prosecution may well streamline trials by convincing defendants to stipulate
to the policy of genocide and focus their defenses soley on their alleged role
in it. Some may well confess, express remorse, and ask for the Tribunal's
mercy.
Observers will wonder, however, why the prosecution did not charge
Kambanda with violations of Article 3 Common to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol II. He did admit that he, as prime
minister, had "exercised de jure and de facto authority over senior civil
servants and senior officers in the military."' 6 He also admitted that he
had issued the Directive on Civil Defense, which was addressed to the prefets
on May 25, 1994, and that this directive encouraged and reinforced the
Interahamwe who were committing mass killings of the Tutsi civilian
population in the prefectures." 7 Kambanda further acknowledged that by
this directive the government assumed responsibility for the actions of the
Interahamwe." 8 Consequently, by virtue of the humanitarian law principle
of command responsibility, Kambanada is culpable for those violations of
Article 3 Common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol
II committed by the military forces and the Interahamwe.
The Akayesu case has immense factual and jurisprudential importance.
During the trial, the Chamber heard forty-two witnesses, including five expert
witnesses. Many of those testifying were eye-witnesses and victims, who
told gruesome stories of their ordeals. The proceedings generated more than
4000 pages of transcripts and 125 evidentiary documents. 1 9 The final
Judgment runs over 200 pages.
This article addressed only a limited number of the case's many
important issues. With its decision in Akayesu, the Trial Chamber expanded
the Genocide Convention and Tribunal Statute and introduced a subjective
standard for determining what groups in a particular society are protected by
the Genocide Convention. Arguably, by definition there would have been no
genocide in Rwanda had the Chamber not done so. In addition, the Chamber
explicated a method for determining an individual's constructive genocidal
intent. It also offered definitions of rape and sexual violence for purposes of
humanitarian law.

116. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, § III.A.,
117. Id.
118. Id.

39(ii).

119. Judgment in the Case Against Akayesu (nonofficial -

for media information only)

(available on the U.N. Website).
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Given Akayesu's de jure and de facto authority and given the fact that
Akayesu, dressed in a military jacket and carrying a military weapon, had
accompanied the Interahamwe on some of its criminal missions against
civilians, some observers will criticize the Chamber for not finding Akayesu
guilty of violations of Article 3 Common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and Additional Protocol 11.12° The prosecution has already appealed the not
guilty verdicts concerning the charges against Akayesu of violations of
Article 3 Common (murder and cruel treatment) and Article 4(2)(e) of
Additional Protocol II (outrage upon personal dignity, in particular rape,
degrading and humiliating treatment and indecent assault). 12 ' Consequently, the Appeals Chamber in The Hague will have the final word on these
issues. This case has generated some major contributions to humanitarian
law. Undoubtedly, it will also generate voluminous commentary.

120. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, §§ 7.1, 8.
121. Press Release No. 144, ICTR/INFO-9-2-144 (7 Oct. 1998), Arusha, TZ. Akayesu has
also appealed his conviction. Id.
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